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The purpose of this paper is to deepen resource-based view theory by analyzing how intellectual capital (IC) affects performance in temporary teams and by showing the moderating role of integrative mechanisms.

The research context focuses on 153 national teams of football (NTF), also referred to as national soccer teams, as an example of temporary groups. A partial least squares (PLS) methodology was utilized on a data set built from transfermarkt.com and FIFA world rankings. Three main hypotheses were developed and tested using first a PLS and then an OLS approach.

The results show how IC contributes to performance, extending the findings of previous studies to the context of temporary teams. Additionally, the results show how some integrative mechanisms such as assembly decisions and team leader experience influence temporary team performance by creating an interaction effect with existing IC.

This study contributes to IC theories for three reasons. First, it applies IC research to a specific research context: temporary teams, where specific organizational capabilities are required to coordinate resources. Second, the study analyzes the role of integrative mechanisms as moderators of the relationship between IC and performance in temporary teams. Third, the study focuses on NTF as an example of temporary teams.

This paper focuses on the proliferation of empirical measures of competitive balance arising from its multi-dimensionality (i.e. win dispersion versus performance persistence), and the increasing complexity and specificity of league structures. This has led to significant inconsistencies in the assessments of competitive balance, rendering it difficult to derive policy recommendations.

The authors extend previous empirical studies of the four North American major leagues (i.e. MLB, NFL, NBA and NHL) using six competitive balance measures to (1) compare changes in competitive balance over the period 1960–2019; (2) to investigate the degree to which win dispersion and performance persistence move in the same direction; and (3) to explore the extent to which competitive balance has changed across facility construction eras and regulatory regimes.

The authors find that the assessment of competitive balance is both metric-dependent and time-dependent, reinforcing the importance of using a portfolio of measures rather than a single metric. The findings also highlight the importance of understanding the dispersion-persistence relationship.

The authors stress that leagues must be aware of a potential dispersion-persistence trade-off when intervening to improve competitive balance.

The purpose of this paper is to address the problem of designing league regulatory mechanisms given the multi-dimensionality of competitive balance and the proliferation of empirical measures.

A three-stage approach is adopted. Firstly, a taxonomy of empirical measures of competitive balance is proposed, identifying two fundamental dimensions – win dispersion and performance persistence. Secondly, a simple two-team model of league competitive balance is used to explore the dispersion–persistence relationship. Third, correlation and regression analysis of seven empirical measures of competitive balance for the 18 best-attended top-tier domestic football leagues in Europe over the 10 seasons, 2008–2017, are used to (1) validate the proposed categorisation of empirical measures into two dimensions; and (2) investigate the nature of the dispersion–persistence relationship across leagues.

The simple model of league competitive balance implies a strong positive dispersion–persistence relationship when persistence effects increase for big-market teams relative to those for the small-market teams. However, the empirical evidence indicates that while leagues such as the Spanish La Liga exhibit a strong positive dispersion–persistence relationship, other leagues show little or no relationship, and some leagues, particularly, the English Premier League and top-tier divisions in Belgium and Netherlands, have a strong negative dispersion–persistence relationship. The key policy implication for leagues is the importance of understanding the direction and impact of dispersion and persistence effects on the demand for league products.

The variability in the strength and direction of the dispersion–persistence relationship across leagues is an important result that undermines the “one-size-fits-all” approach to designing league regulatory mechanisms.

This paper analyses the media ownership of professional sports teams. The theory of vertical integration is used to identify internal efficiency gains, lower uncertainty and increased market power as general explanations. The industryspecific reasons are examined, particularly the importance of securing access to broadcasting rights. The potential implications for teams, leagues and fans are discussed. It is suggested that media ownership of teams may undermine the sporting and financial viability of leagues thus necessitating intervention by sports administrators and government regulators.

Sports leagues and media providers are constantly seeking new ways of improving the consumption experience of viewers. Several new technologies have arrived in the industry, but many have not proved financially viable. Among these new technologies is tracking technology, used to augment television coverage and for coaching enhancement. This has had mixed results. In this paper I argue that the emergence of Moneyball management practices in sport have created the supervening necessity (Winston, 1998) required to drive demand for player tracking technology in ice hockey. This technology is able to collect the data necessary to implement statistical analyses comparable to those used in professional baseball to cover media enhancement, coaching enhancement and Moneyball management.

Using the team performance‐club profit framework, a formal model is developed of the determination of the transfer fees paid by football clubs when players are traded for cash. It is argued that transfer fees can involve monopoly rents; the selling club extracts a share of the nonnegative differential between its reservation price and the buying club’s maximum bid‐price. It is shown that a necessary condition for the presence of monopoly rents can be established by testing whether buying‐club characteristics are jointly significant determinants of transfer fees after controlling for player characteristics, time effects and selling‐club characteristics. Using a sample of 1,350 English professional football transfer fees covering the period June 1990 to August 1996, it is found that monopoly rents may exist but the degree of monopoly rents may differ with the size of the transfer fee.

Using recent literature, examines developments in seven macroeconomic schools of thought: orthodox Keynesian, monetarist, new classical, real business cycle theory, new Keynesian, Austrian and post‐Keynesian. Describes all of these and classifies them as orthodox, new or radical. After setting out the differences, discusses the degree of agreement between the schools of thought. Concludes that macroeconomics is constantly evolving, resulting in new disagreements requiring a new consensus.